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THE EMERGING NEED FOR HYBRID 
ENTITIES: WHY CALIFORNIA SHOULD 




          Recognizing the limitations and restraints posed on socially 
conscious for-profit organizations, several states have begun to develop 
a legislative model that blends attributes of traditional for-profit and 
not-for-profit entities into “hybrid” organizations. Chief among these 
states is California, which has emerged as a leader of this new social 
enterprise reform. California is the only state to allow a business to 
incorporate as a Benefit Corporation or a Flexible Purpose 
Corporation. Additionally, the state legislature has proposed a third 
type of hybrid entity—the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company. By 
addressing the limitations of the traditional corporate structure, 
California’s new hybrid entities afford directors, founders, and officers 
not only with increased legal protection, but also promote confidence to 
pursue social and environmental causes. This Article explains why 
California is the preferred choice for social enterprises and how an 
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 I.  INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, American businesses have measured their success 
by their ability to maximize profits and, in turn, shareholder wealth.1 
However, this narrow purview ignores a small but emerging group of 
businesses that measure success not just by financial gains, but also 
by evaluating the company’s social and environmental impacts.2 
Dubbed “social enterprises,” the directors of these companies seek to 
maximize profits while actively pursuing a social purpose.3 No two 
companies have better embodied this evolving business philosophy 
than Ben & Jerry’s, a Vermont-based ice cream manufacturer,4 and 
Patagonia, a California-based outdoor-apparel retailer.5 
Both Ben & Jerry’s and Patagonia trace their unwavering 
dedication to social missions to their exuberant, steadfast founders.6 
With the 1978 creation of Ben & Jerry’s, Ben Cohen and Jerry 
Greenfield wanted to create not just a new ice cream flavor, but a 
new ice cream experience.7 Similarly, Yvon Chouinard believed that 
he could create better outdoor apparel and equipment, and created 
Patagonia in 1972.8 As Ben & Jerry’s and Patagonia’s brands gained 
recognition and their sales began to increase, the founders focused on 
not just the bottom-line profits, but improving their communities as 
well.9 Chouinard, Greenfield, and Cohen chose to veer away from 
 
 1. Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect Socially 
Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 770 (2009). 
 2. Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 591 (2011). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Company Overview of Ben & Jerry's Homemade Inc., BUS. WK., http:// 
investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=109887 (last visited 
July 7, 2013). 
 5. Company Overview of Patagonia, Inc., BUS. WK., http://investing.businessweek.com 
/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=7901350 (last visited July 7, 2013). 
 6. See infra notes 7–10 and accompanying text. 
 7. Our History, BEN & JERRY’S, http://www.benjerry.com/company/history (last visited 
July 7, 2013). 
 8. Company Info: Our History, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/us/patagonia.go 
?assetid=2047&ln=140 (last visited July 7, 2013). The original name of the company was 
Chouinard Equipment. Id. 
 9. Cohen and Greenfield affectionately referred to this approach as the “double dip.” 
Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, The Truth About Ben and Jerry’s, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 
39, 39 (2012), available at http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/the_truth_about_ben_and 
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the traditional corporate maxim that profits should be valued above 
all else, and instead measured their companies’ success by using a 
“double bottom line”: maximizing profits and social objectives.10 
Both Patagonia and Ben & Jerry’s prescribed to this  
dual-purpose approach, which ultimately led the companies to 
develop and pursue similar societal and environmental initiatives.11 
Patagonia and Ben & Jerry’s donated a percentage of their revenues 
to charities,12 created and funded new charitable campaigns,13 paid 
local vendors a premium for ingredients,14 limited their waste output 
and carbon footprint,15 treated their employees better than their 
competitors did,16 and even initiated campaigns to protect 
 
_jerrys [hereinafter Page, Truth About Ben & Jerry’s]. Chouinard dubbed it the “slow company” 
because of its long-term, sustainable focus. Firms with Benefits, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 2012, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21542432. 
 10. See supra note 9. 
 11. See infra notes 12–17 and accompanying text. 
 12. Compare Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law 
and the Sale of a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 219 (2010) [hereinafter Page, 
Freezing Out Ben & Jerry], and Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? 
Applying Traditional Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 221, 222 (2012) (stating that Ben & Jerry’s donated 7.5 percent 
of pretax profits to charity), with Seth Stevenson, Patagonia's Founder Is America's Most 
Unlikely Business Guru, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424052702303513404577352221465986612.html#articleTabs%3Darticle (stating that 
Patagonia donates at least 1 percent of total revenues to grassroots causes). 
 13. Compare Page, Truth About Ben & Jerry’s, supra note 9, at 40, and Plerhoples, supra 
note 12, at 222 (stating that Ben & Jerry’s created the Ben & Jerry’s Foundation), with Stevenson, 
supra note 12 (stating that Patagonia created the "1% for the Planet" campaign). 
 14. Compare Page, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry, supra note 12, at 211, 220–21 (stating that 
Ben & Jerry’s paid a premium for local Vermont milk, Brazilian nuts from impoverished villages, 
and other Fair-Trade certified and organic ingredients), with Stevenson, supra note 12 (stating 
that Chouinard switched “from conventional to organic cotton—despite the fact that it initially 
tripled his supply costs”). 
 15. Compare Page, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry, supra note 12, at 221 (stating that Ben & 
Jerry’s created eco-friendly packaging containers), with Marc Lifsher, Businesses Seek State's 
New 'Benefit Corporation' Status, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2012, available at http://articles.latimes 
.com/2012/jan/04/business/la-fi-benefit-corporations-20120104 [hereinafter Lifsher, Businesses 
Seek] (stating that Patagonia uses sustainable manufacturing techniques), and Patagonia, Inc.,  
B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/community/directory/patagonia (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) 
(75 percent of materials used are recycled or environmentally preferred), and Stevenson, supra 
note 12 (Patagonia created the Sustainable Apparel Coalition, which has “craft[ed] clear, 
quantifiable standards for environmentally responsible clothing production”). 
 16. Compare Page, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry, supra note 12, at 223 (“Ben & Jerry's was 
also committed to paying its employees a living wage and generous benefits,
 
including being one 
of the first companies to offer health care benefits to employees' same sex partners.”), and 
Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 222 (“[T]he company disbursed five percent of the company's pretax 
profits to employees as cash bonuses each year”), with Patagonia, Inc., supra note 15 (stating that 
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endangered rain forests.17 In turn, Ben & Jerry’s and Patagonia’s 
socially conscious management style yielded tremendous benefits for 
each company’s employees, communities, and the environment.18 
Even shareholders, satisfied with their stock returns, initially 
supported their companies’ commitment to social causes.19 Given 
these positive gains, Chouinard, Greenfield, and Cohen were 
confident that their companies could sustain their societal and 
environmental initiatives into the foreseeable future.20 
Unfortunately for Cohen and Greenfield, some Ben & Jerry’s 
shareholders began to question their founders’ societal enthusiasm as 
the company’s financial growth—and thus the shareholders’ 
returns—slowed in the mid-1990s.21 Recognizing discontent among 
some of Ben & Jerry’s investors, several companies staged takeover 
attempts by tendering offers to the company’s shareholders.22 The 
takeover attempts culminated in 2000, when Unilever, a 
multinational consumer goods corporation, made a tender offer of 
$43.60 per share to Ben & Jerry’s shareholders.23 
Fearing that Unilever would undo Ben & Jerry’s longstanding 
social and environmental initiatives to increase short-term profits, 
 
Patagonia “extend[ed] health benefits to part-time, retail, [and] warehouse staff”), and Stevenson, 
supra note 12 (stating that Patagonia offered free on-site day care and flex-time work hours to 
employees). 
 17. Compare Page, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry, supra note 12, at 222 (describing Ben & 
Jerry’s “Rain Forest Preservation” initiatives), with Christopher Pummer, Buttons May Help Save 
Rain Forests, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1990, http://articles.latimes.com/1990-09-25/local/me 
-1058_1_plastic-buttons (describing Patagonia’s campaign to save a 245,000-acre area in 
Ecuador's Esmeraldas province). 
 18. Ben & Jerry’s social contributions and sales “grew impressively” in the 1990s. Page, 
Freezing Out Ben & Jerry, supra note 12, at 221–24. Patagonia continued to increase its 
environmental and social donations as it experienced “overambitious growth” in the late 1980s. 
See Stevenson, supra note 12. 
 19. See Page, Truth About Ben & Jerry’s, supra note 9, at 40. 
 20. Greenfield and Cohen sought to create a company “dedicated to a sustainable corporate 
concept of linked prosperity.” Page, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry, supra note 12, at 219. Chouinard 
has stated repeatedly that he wanted to “build a company that could last 100 years.” B-Corp, 
PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/eu/enCZ/patagonia.go?assetid=70725 (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2013). 
 21. See Page, Truth About Ben & Jerry’s, supra note 9, at 40 (stating that as the company’s 
financial growth began to slow down in the mid-1990s, some investors began to argue “that the 
company’s social mission was a luxury it could no longer afford”). 
 22. See id. A tender offer is a public offer to shareholders that is higher than the current 
market stock price. Page, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry, supra note 12, at 231. 
 23. Page, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry, supra note 12, at 226; Page, Truth About Ben & 
Jerry’s, supra note 9, at 39–40. 
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Cohen and Greenfield pieced together a counteroffer to 
shareholders.24 Despite their best efforts, the founders could not 
match Unilever’s offer.25 Afraid of the impending class action 
lawsuits against them26 and the future legal consequences for not 
maximizing shareholder wealth,27 the Ben & Jerry’s board (including 
Cohen and Greenfield) begrudgingly accepted the buyout by 
Unilever.28 
As Cohen and Greenfield anticipated, once it obtained control, 
Unilever promptly began to eliminate Ben & Jerry’s social 
missions.29 In fact, within three years after the sale to Unilever, the 
new management of Ben & Jerry’s had terminated 20 percent of the 
company’s workforce and stopped distributing a 7.5 percent share of 
profits to its charitable foundation.30 
Although Patagonia, like Ben & Jerry’s, experienced periods of 
slow growth in the mid-1990s, it has been able to avoid a fate similar 
to Ben & Jerry’s.31 Chouinard ensured the longevity of Patagonia’s 
social missions by maintaining Patagonia as a closely held private 
company wholly owned by him and his wife.32 By doing so, 
 
 24. The Scoop on Ben & Jerry’s Sellout, SLATE (Apr. 12, 2000, 3:05 PM), http://www.slate 
.com/articles/business/moneybox/2000/04/the_scoop_on_ben_jerrys_sellout.html. 
 25. Page, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry, supra note 12, at 225–26. 
 26. Id. at 229 (“Indeed, three class action lawsuits alleging that the directors were breaching 
their fiduciary duties to shareholders by failing to maximize shareholder value were filed while 
the [Unilever] deal was being negotiated.”). 
 27. Id. at 228–29. 
 28. Id. at 229 (“Cohen . . . [said that corporate law] ‘required the board of directors of Ben & 
Jerry’s to take an offer, to sell the company despite the fact that they did not want to sell the 
company.’ Greenfield agreed: ‘[W]e were a public company, and the board of directors’ primary 
responsibility is the interest of the shareholders. . . . It was nothing about Unilever; we didn’t 
want to get bought by anybody.’”). 
 29. Id. at 225–28. 
 30. Id. at 243 (“In the three years since 4-11 [2000], Ben & Jerry's has seen its social mission 
begin to seep away—Unilever has laid off one in five B&J employees, stopped donating 7.5 
percent of profits to the Ben & Jerry's Foundation, and hired a CEO Cohen didn't approve of.” 
(Citation omitted)). 
 31. See generally Company Info, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/us/patagonia.go 
?assetid=2047&ln=140 (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (“Staying true to our core values during 
thirty-plus years in business has helped us create a company we’re proud to run and work for.”). 
 32. See Stevenson, supra note 12 (explaining Chouinard’s ability to grow a multimillion 
dollar company without bringing in outside equity investors or borrowing substantial sums is a 
rare and difficult feat). See generally James Clear, 5 People Who Turned $1,000 into $1 Million, 
US NEWS (Mar. 15, 2012), money.usnews.com/money/blogs/my-money/2012/03/15/5-people-
who-turned-1000-into-1-million (noting that “[b]uilding a million-dollar business from scratch 
isn't easy . . . .”). 
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Chouinard was able to eliminate the possibility that disgruntled 
shareholders would file derivative actions against the board for 
failing to maximize shareholder wealth.33 However, with his 
retirement on the horizon, the seventy-three-year-old recently 
became concerned about the long-term protection of his company’s 
social missions.34 
The growing concerns of socially conscious founders, like 
Chouinard, combined with the unraveling of double bottom line 
businesses, like Ben & Jerry’s, prompted several state legislatures to 
create new corporate forms for socially concerned companies.35 
These new hybrid corporate forms seek to combine elements of 
traditional nonprofit and for-profit entities.36 California has emerged 
as one of the leaders of this new social enterprise reform.37 
Seeking to protect the legacy of his company’s social missions, 
Chouinard, whose company is based in Ventura, California, took 
immediate actions to take advantage of California’s new social 
enterprise forms.38 In fact, Patagonia became the first company to 
register as one of California’s new social hybrid entities39 when it 
filed to become a Benefit Corporation40 on January 3, 2012.41 
Whatever path Chouinard decides to take in the future, his 
company’s social and environmental missions are now better 
protected under California’s new social hybrid forms.42 
This Note argues that California’s new social enterprise forms 
are a necessary vehicle for socially geared businesses that seek to 
 
 33. See Stevenson, supra note 12. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., MARK DESAULNIER, ANALYSIS OF ORIGINAL BILL—SB 201 (2011), available 
at www.ftb.ca.gov/law/legis/11_12bills/sb201_020811.pdf. When California lawmakers 
discussed the purpose for creating the Flexible Purpose Corporation entity they cited that “[t]he 
story of Ben and Jerry’s Ice Cream is an example of why a new entity form is sought.” Id. at 2. 
 36. See infra Part III. 
 37. See infra notes 132–35 and accompanying text. 
 38. Bart King, Patagonia Is First to Register for ‘Benefit Corporation’ Status in California, 
SUSTAINABLE BRANDS (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.sustainablebrands.com/news_and_views 
/articles/patagonia-first-register-%E2%80%98benefit-corporation%E2%80%99-status-california; 
John Tozzi, Patagonia Road Tests New Sustainability Legal Status, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 4, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-04/patagonia-road-tests-new-sustainability-legal-
status.html. 
 39. See Stevenson, supra note 12. 
 40. See infra notes 171–89 and accompanying text. 
 41. Stevenson, supra note 12. 
 42. See King, supra note 38; Lifsher, Businesses Seek, supra note 15. 
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pursue societal and environmental missions without compromising 
profits and growth, or fearing adverse financial and litigation 
repercussions. Part II describes the traditional corporate forms under 
California law and explains the limitations that both forms place on 
social enterprises. Part III first examines two new California 
corporate forms, the Flexible Purpose Corporation and the Benefit 
Corporation, and one proposed California corporate form, the Low-
Profit Limited Liability Company, before analyzing the impact that 
each of these forms could have on California social enterprises. Part 
IV clarifies the need for these new social hybrids by describing how 
the new forms remedy the limitations that are imposed on social 
enterprises under the traditional corporate structure. Lastly, Part V 
explains why California is a preferred choice for social enterprises, 
illustrates how the influx of social enterprises could benefit the state, 
and ultimately, proposes immediate steps California should take to 
secure its position as the leader of social enterprise law. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
To examine why Cohen and Greenfield were unable to protect 
Ben & Jerry’s from a corporate takeover, it is important to 
understand the traditional structure of corporate and nonprofit law. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has continually restricted “the growth of 
federal law into the areas of state corporate law.”43 As a result, each 
state’s corporate code44 is a unique product of its own state’s 
legislature.45 
A.  Traditional Corporate/Nonprofit Structure 
Traditionally, states have required incorporating businesses to 
 
 43. See Francis J. Facciolo & Richard L. Stone, Avoiding the Inevitable: The Continuing 
Viability of State Law Claims in the Face of the Primary Jurisdiction and Preemption Challenges 
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 525, 548–49 (1995). 
 44. J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance, Enforcement, 
Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1, 9 (2011). This Note will focus on California corporate law. 
 45. If a conflict of law arises between two states, the “internal affairs doctrine” will apply. 
Vaughn v. LJ Int’l, Inc., 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 166, 173 (Ct. App. 2009). This doctrine, which is 
incorporated in California under Corporations Code section 2116, will apply the law of the state 
of incorporation (with limited exceptions). 9 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 
§ 239 (10th ed. 2005). 
HYBRID ENTITIES 9/29/2014 10:51 AM 
2014] HYBRID ENTITIES 627 
 
make an election of either a for-profit or a not-for-profit entity.46 
This traditional binary system poses many problems for social 
enterprises that wish to simultaneously pursue apparently 
inconsistent goals: maximizing societal gains (as a nonprofit entity 
would) and maximizing financial gains (as a for-profit entity 
would).47 
1.  Nonprofit Entities 
The creation of the nonprofit code was an important step for the 
socially conscious businessman because it allowed a business to 
pursue a social mission irrespective of profits.48 Not only did the 
code initially grant managerial flexibility to socially conscious 
directors,49 but the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) also granted 
unique financial advantages to nonprofits.50 Most notably, the IRS 
granted nonprofit organizations tax-exempt status.51 In addition, the 
IRS decided that a donation to a qualifying nonprofit would yield a 
tax deduction for the donor.52 As a result of these deductions, the 
nonprofit form has been more likely to receive capital from 
established charities or foundations.53 
However, to protect against potential abuses, the IRS also 
imposed several strict limitations on nonprofits.54 These restrictions 
hamper a nonprofit’s ability to make a profit in several ways.55 First, 
nonprofits are restricted in what activities the business can pursue,56 
because nonprofits must pursue “public or charitable purposes.”57 
The IRS also monitors each nonprofit to ensure that its activities 
 
 46. Felicia R. Resor, Benefit Corporation Legislation, 12 WYO. L. REV. 91, 93 (2012). 
 47. See infra notes 48–86 and accompanying text. 
 48. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). To qualify as a tax-exempt entity, the IRS actually requires 
that nonprofits pursue a mission (e.g., religious or charitable) over profits. Id. 
 49. See id. (listing the social purposes that a nonprofit can pursue). 
 50. See id. § 501(a). 
 51. Id. Thus, a qualifying nonprofit pays no income taxes. Id. § 501(a), (c)(3). 
 52. I.R.C. § 170(a),(c) (2012); Christen Clarke, California’s Flexible Purpose Corporation: 
A Step Forward, A Step Back, or No Step at All?, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 301,  
303–04 (2011). 
 53. See Clarke, supra note 52, at 303–04. 
 54. See infra notes 55–60 and accompanying text. 
 55. Resor, supra note 46, at 95. 
 56. Clarke, supra note 52, at 303–04. 
 57. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5111 (West 2012). These purposes must be set out in the nonprofit’s 
articles of incorporation, a legal document that each California business entity must file with the 
Secretary of State before it can come into legal existence. Id. §§ 200(c), 5133. 
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remain within the scope of its stated charitable or public purposes.58 
If the IRS determines that the nonprofit’s activities are unrelated to 
its charitable purpose,59 the agency has the power to strip the 
nonprofit of its tax-exempt status.60 The fear of losing their coveted 
tax-exempt status keeps many nonprofits from pursuing new, 
possibly profitable, business opportunities.61 
Second, the nonprofit form constrains the potential earnings for 
founders and directors.62 Owners and directors of a nonprofit cannot 
appropriate their firm’s revenues “for their personal benefit.”63 Even 
during the course of a sale, an owner is precluded from selling his 
nonprofit “beyond reasonable compensation.”64 
Third, nonprofits have a limited ability to expand or grow.65 A 
California nonprofit cannot offer stock, equity, or even a salary to 
equity investors.66 As a result, nonprofits must rely solely on 
donations, debt, and retained earnings.67 With a limited pool of 
donors and a strict policy of enforcing the pursuit of a charitable 
mission over profitability, a nonprofit may struggle to gain the 
capital it needs to expand.68 
For some social entrepreneurs, the tax advantages and ability to 
receive donations make the nonprofit form a viable option for their 
businesses.69 However, for others, the severe restrictions on business 
activities, personal earnings, and expansion make the nonprofit 
 
 58. See I.R.C. § 501(b) (2012); COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR 501(C)(3) PUBLIC CHARITIES, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 14, 23 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf 
/p4221pc.pdf. 
 59. Clarke, supra note 52, at 303–04. This income is commonly called the unrelated 
business taxable income (UBTI). Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 83 
(2010). 
 62. Id. at 67. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 75. Further devaluing the sale price of a nonprofit, the “nonprofit compensation is 
calculated retrospectively and not prospectively. As a result, founder and controllers may decline 
to sell (or ‘convert’) a nonprofit organization to a for-profit entity . . . .” Id. at 94–95. 
 65. See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 66. Katz & Page, supra note 61, at 67. A salary cannot be offered to equity investors as a 
“pretext for distributing profits to them.” Id. 
 67. Id. at 94. Retained earnings are the revenues left over after all debts, taxes, and costs of a 
business are paid off. A nonprofit is not likely to yield high retained earnings as their focus is on 
charitable purposes, not profit margins. Id. at 94–95. 
 68. Murray & Hwang, supra note 44, at 10. 
 69. See supra text accompanying notes 48–53. 
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model an unattractive vehicle for social enterprises.70 Thus, many 
social enterprises adopt the structure of the for-profit corporation in 
an attempt to fulfill the needs of their growing businesses.71 
2.  For-Profit Entities 
Compared to nonprofits, the profit-making advantages of for-
profit entities have made them significantly more popular with 
Californian entrepreneurs.72 Although California offers several 
different for-profit forms, the relative advantages of the corporation 
and the limited liability company form have made them a perennial 
favorite among modern entrepreneurs.73 
Unlike a nonprofit company, a for-profit company is 
unrestricted in its purpose and can engage in “any lawful business 
activity.”74 Thus, a for-profit can quickly expand or diversify its 
operations to capitalize on new business opportunities.75 This 
flexibility to pursue different business activities generally enables 
for-profits to generate higher returns than nonprofits.76 Additionally, 
the California Corporations Code provides for-profits a vital source 
of capital that is unavailable to nonprofits: equity investors.77 Unlike 
a charitable contribution, where the donor seeks no financial return, 
investors in for-profit companies buy an ownership stake78 in that 
 
 70. See Murray & Hwang, supra note 44, at 10. 
 71. See Clarke, supra note 52, at 310. 
 72. Compare California Counties: Tax Exempt/Nonprofit Organizations, 
TAXEXEMPTWORLD.COM, http://www.taxexemptworld.com/organizations/california-counties 
.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) (stating that there are 217,335 nonprofit entities in California), 
with Number of California Small Businesses, GAEBLER.COM, http://www.gaebler.com/Number-of 
-Small-Businesss-in-California.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) (listing that California is home to 
3,320,977 small businesses). 
 73. See W. Derrick Britt et al., Frequently Asked Questions: The Flexible Purpose 
Corporation and Senate Bill 201, BUS. FOR GOOD (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.businessforgood.co 
/2011/03/frequently-asked-questions-proposed.html. “Entrepreneurs . . . have historically been 
limited to two primary corporate vehicles—the corporation and the limited liability company.” Id. 
For this reason, this Note will be referring to both corporations and limited liability companies 
when it refers to “for-profits.” 
 74. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17002(a) (West 2013) (referring to the purpose of a Limited 
Liability Corporation). Corporations use nearly the same language: “the purpose of the 
corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity.” Id. § 202 (b)(1)(A). 
 75. See Murray & Hwang, supra note 44, at 21–22. 
 76. See id. at 10. 
 77. CAL. CORP. CODE § 400 (West 2013); Katz & Page, supra note 61, at 62. 
 78. The ownership stake is commonly referred to as purchasing stock or shares of equity. 
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 184 (West 2013). 
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company, and thus are entitled to receive financial returns.79 Because 
for-profit entities have the potential to yield a return exceeding the 
tax savings given for making an equivalent donation to a charity, the 
vast majority of investors would rather invest in for-profits than 
donate to nonprofits.80 
The quest to maximize profits, however, does not come without 
its pitfalls.81 Pursuing profits above all else commonly forces social 
enterprises to sacrifice social and environmental initiatives.82 
Directors of for-profit entities are required by California law to act in 
the “best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.”83 If a 
director acts in a way that does not adhere to this standard, the 
director may be liable84 to the corporation’s shareholders for breach 
of fiduciary duty.85 Fearing possible lawsuits from shareholders, 
some directors forego social and environmental initiatives to comply 
with the shareholder wealth-maximization norm.86 
B.  Unsuccessful Attempts to Bridge Binary Corporate Structure 
Recognizing the weak alternatives for social ventures that were 
technically neither for-profit nor nonprofit, some states attempted to 
safeguard social entrepreneurs through judicially created 
 
 79. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 400 (West 2013). 
 80. See Jim Witkin, The L3C: A More Creative Capitalism, TRIPLE PUNDIT (Jan. 15, 2009), 
http://www.triplepundit.com/2009/01/the-l3c-a-more-creative-capitalism. 
 81. See infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
 82. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“The 
corporate form in which [Defendant] craigslist operates, however, is not an appropriate vehicle 
for purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other stockholders interested in realizing 
a return on their investment.”). 
 83. CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 2013). 
 84. Evangeline Gomez, The Rise of the Charitable For-Profit Entity, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2012, 
6:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/evangelinegomez/2012/01/13/the-rise-of-the-charitable 
-for-profit-entity. 
 85. Resor, supra note 46, at 95. Fiduciary duties include serving the best interests of the 
corporation in “good faith” and with “such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily 
prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances.” CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 309(a). 
 86. See Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 239 (“[R]isk-averse directors of a social enterprise—
fearing liability for a breach of fiduciary duties—may feel obligated to recommend an acquisition 
by an entity that intends to scale back or even abandon the social or environmental mission of the 
social enterprise.”). Although California courts do not explicitly adopt the shareholder wealth-
maximization norm, the notion is prevalent in Delaware case law. See infra notes 106–22 and 
accompanying text. 
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presumptions and legislatively created statutes.87 Specifically, states 
tried to fashion sweeping constituency statutes88 or grant more 
deference under the age-old “business judgment rule.”89 While both 
the constituency statutes and the business judgment rule do provide 
some additional safeguards for social ventures, neither provides 
adequate protection.90 
1.  Constituency Statutes 
Constituency statutes, if enacted by a state legislature, enable a 
corporation to consider stakeholders’ and other constituencies’91 
interests alongside shareholders’ interests.92 Although a majority of 
states93 have passed corporate constituency statutes,94 the statutes 
remain relatively untested in state and federal courts.95 With few 
cases defining the scope and validity of these statutes, directors of 
corporations remain wary that corporate constituency statutes will 
fully protect them.96 Constituency statutes hold even less efficacy for 
California businesses as California has not passed a constituency 
statute.97 Simply put, overarching constituency statutes do not 
provide sufficient protection to allow otherwise risk-averse directors 
to make socially beneficial decisions.98 
 
 87. See infra notes 88–89. 
 88. ERIC L. TALLEY, CORPORATE FORM AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A STATUS 
REPORT FROM CALIFORNIA (AND BEYOND),1, 3 (2012) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144567 (follow “Download This Paper” hyperlink); see infra notes  
91–92. 
 89. See Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 241. 
 90. See infra notes 91–104 and accompanying text. 
 91. Britt et al., supra note 73 (stating that constituencies include “shareholders, employees, 
customers, suppliers, creditors, communities, society as a whole, and long-term interests”). 
 92. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 3 (stating that constituency statutes “provide legal protection 
for corporate directors who wish to weigh stakeholder considerations alongside shareholder 
return”). 
 93. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 4 n.7; Britt et al., supra note 73. 
 94. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 4 n.7 (noting that thirty states have passed constituency 
statutes). 
 95. See Britt et al., supra note 73 (stating that “state courts have almost unanimously failed 
to interpret such provisions”). 
 96. Id. 
 97. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 4; Britt et al., supra note 73. Delaware, the leader of corporate 
law, also does not have an “other constituencies” statute. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 4 n.7. 
 98. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
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2.  Business Judgment Rule 
The business judgment rule (BJR) is a judicially created doctrine 
that presumes directors make business decisions that are in the 
company’s best interest.99 California courts have recognized the BJR 
as a “judicial policy of deference to the business judgment of 
corporate directors in the exercise of their broad discretion in making 
corporate decisions.”100 Recognizing that business directors are 
better suited to make their company’s decisions than the courts, the 
BJR presumption is meant to act as a shield for all prudent, 
reasonable, and well-intentioned director decisions.101 However, 
courts are still uncertain of the BJR’s outer boundaries,102 because 
the rule offers limited protection when: (1) shareholder wealth is 
sacrificed for societal gains; (2) the sale of a company is imminent; 
or (3) the individual seeking to apply the rule is an officer, not a 
director.103 This uncertainty often serves to narrow or constrain the 
decision making of corporate managers when they are considering 
the implementation of social or environmental policies for at least 
three significant reasons.104 
First and foremost, courts have held that the BJR offers limited 
protection for company officials that place social and environmental 
considerations ahead of shareholder welfare.105 Dodge v. Ford Motor 
 
 99. Clarke, supra note 52, at 317 n.157. 
 100. Everest Investors 8 v. McNeil Partners, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 31, 45 (Ct. App. 2003) (certified 
for partial publication); Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 702, 710 (Ct. App. 1989). 
California has codified the BJR presumption. Cal. Corp. Code § 309 (West 2013); Berg & Berg 
Enters., LLC v. Boyle, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875, 897 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 101. Clarke, supra note 52, at 317 n. 157. 
 102. Peter Smith, Are the Managers of Traditional Corporations “Really” Required to 
Maximize Profits to Shareholders? A Review of eBay v. Craigslist et al., in the Argument 
Supporting “Hybrid” Social Enterprises, APEX LAW GRP. (June 6, 2012), http://www.apexlg 
.com/?p=305. (“It’s unclear where the business judgment rule’s outer boundaries are located . . . 
.”). 
 103. See infra notes 105–126 and accompanying text. 
 104. See Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 248–49. 
 105. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 4 (stating that “for decisions that obviously sacrifice 
shareholder welfare for the benefit of other considerations (including social purposes), the BJR 
provides no protection”); Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 248 (stating the BJR offers “limited 
protection for directors and officers who attempt to consider all business decisions in light of both 
the social mission and profit motives of the corporation”); Smith, supra note 102 (stating that 
“there are limits to the business judgment rule and the ability for management to consider social 
and environmentally friendly policies at the expense of shareholder value in the traditional for-
profit corporate structure”). 
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Co.106 was the seminal case that illustrated the limitations of BJR 
protection when shareholder wealth was sacrificed for a social 
purpose.107 Despite yielding sufficient profits, Henry Ford, the 
President and majority shareholder of Ford Motor Company,108 and 
Ford Motor’s board of directors withheld a shareholder dividend and 
instead reinvested the money back into Ford Motors.109 The board 
intended to use the retained earnings of the company to benefit the 
company’s stakeholders, particularly its employees.110 The Supreme 
Court of Michigan rejected the board’s business decision, holding 
that a corporation “is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders.”111 Because Ford’s decision to invest in 
his employees did not directly maximize shareholder wealth, the 
court found that Ford breached his fiduciary duty to his 
shareholders.112 Cases protecting shareholder wealth maximization, 
like Dodge v. Ford, provide a chilling effect on directors 
contemplating social and environmental objectives.113 
Second, the strength of the BJR diminishes greatly during the 
sale or changing of control of a company.114 The Revlon Rule115 
imposes “heightened judicial scrutiny”116 on directors to acquire the 
“best price available” for shareholders when a change in control 
becomes inevitable,117 and does not allow directors to consider a 
company’s social mission.118 Likewise, the BJR presumption is 
 
 106. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 107. See id. at 684. Although this case was decided by a Michigan court, and not in 
California, it still carries great weight. 
 108. Id. at 671. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 671–72 (stating that Ford’s actions were motivated by his ambition “to employ still 
more men; to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help 
them build up their lives and their homes”). 
 111. Id. at 684. 
 112. Id. at 685. 
 113. Although the courts of California have appeared to give little weight to this Michigan 
case, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. has not been formally rejected by California courts and continues 
to be directly followed by many states. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348–49 (1986) (citing Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. to assert that 
“managers, of course, must exercise the privilege in a manner consistent with their fiduciary duty 
to act in the best interests of the corporation . . . .”). 
 114. Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 248–49; Smith, supra note 102. 
 115. Smith, supra note 102. 
 116. Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 226. 
 117. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986). 
 118. Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 226 (“Under certain circumstances, once a social enterprise 
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effectively limited during hostile takeover attempts.119 The Unocal 
Rule initially imposes a stricter judicial review on directors’ 
decisions to implement antitakeover measures.120 The policy behind 
this heightened judicial standard is to protect the wealth of 
shareholders from the possibly self-interested actions of directors.121 
Although the Revlon Rule and Unocal Rule are not explicitly 
accepted under California law, California state courts have cited to 
these doctrines approvingly.122 
Third, the BJR protections do not extend to corporate officers.123 
Citing the clear omission of the word “officers” from section 309 of 
the California Corporations Code, California’s codified version of 
the BJR,124 California courts do not extend the BJR presumption to 
officers of corporations.125 Some courts have even used California’s 
strict interpretation of section 309 to deny directors the BJR 
protection by treating them as mere officers.126 
Ignoring the ambiguous boundaries of the BJR and the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm, and assuming arguendo that 
directors are protected from liability for pursuing a double bottom 
line, the traditional corporate structure still provides inadequate 
 
offers itself for sale, Delaware's Revlon rule would impose heightened judicial scrutiny of the 
transaction and would require the directors to obtain the best sale price reasonably available, 
without considering the social enterprise's social and environmental efforts.”). 
 119. See infra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. 
 120. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985). 
 121. Id. at 954. (“Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in 
its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced 
duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business 
judgment rule may be conferred.”). 
 122. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 4–5, n.9 (stating that “there appears to be no published 
opinion by a California state court at any level that rejects the [Revlon] doctrine, and the handful 
that cite Revlon appear to do so approvingly”). 
 123. Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 702, 711 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating that the 
“judicial deference afforded under the business judgment rule therefore should not apply” to the 
defendants because they “were acting as officer employees of the corporation”); F.D.I.C. v. Van 
Dellen, No. CV 10–4915, 2012 WL 4815159, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2012) (“California courts 
have not extended the [business judgment] rule to officers, and this Court declines to do so.”). 
 124. Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Boyle, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875, 897 (Ct. App. 2009); 
Gaillard, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 710–11. 
 125. See Berg, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 897; Gaillard, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 710–11. 
 126. See, e.g., Gaillard, 256 Cal. Rptr.at 711 (holding that “as a matter of law, our review of 
the conduct of the inside directors is not governed by section 309” because the directors were not 
“‘perform[ing] the duties of a director’ as specified in section 309”); F.D.I.C. v. Castetter, 184 
F.3d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 1998) (referring to the same principle illustrated in Gaillard but stating 
that the BJR does not apply if the director “abdicated his corporate responsibility”). 
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safeguards for the long-term sustainability of social missions.127 
Shareholders have a difficult time monitoring their company’s social 
impact because traditional corporate forms have limited transparency 
and accountability requirements with respect to social and 
environmental policies.128 Risk-averse directors generally prefer 
conservative stances on social initiatives for fear of shareholder 
litigation.129 At times, even founders of social ventures struggle to 
ensure that their company’s social missions will not suffer from 
“mission creep,” the eventual discontinuation of that social mission 
over time.130 
III.  CALIFORNIA’S NEW HYBRID ENTITIES 
As the Ben & Jerry’s story illustrates, the traditional  
black-and-white distinction between for-profit and nonprofit does not 
provide adequate protection or guidance in the evolving area of 
social enterprise law. Recognizing the limitations and restraints 
posed on socially geared for-profit organizations, several states have 
begun to develop a legislative model that blends attributes of 
traditional for-profit and nonprofit entities into “hybrid” 
organizations.131 
Chief among these states is California, which has emerged as a 
leader of this new social enterprise law.132 California is the only state 
to allow a business to incorporate as a Benefit Corporation (“B 
Corp”) or a Flexible Purpose Corporation (FPC).133 Additionally, the 
 
 127. See infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text. 
 128. Resor, supra note 46, at 99. 
 129. Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 248–49 (“[E]ven if the business judgment rule would 
provide liability protection for specific business decisions based on the dual objectives of the 
corporation, directors remain risk-averse and take conservative positions due to the threat of 
litigation.”); Britt et al., supra note 73 (“Because these rules are judicially created and interpreted, 
and because litigation is prevalent, even where judicial guidance exists, directors and their 
lawyers tend to apply risk-averse interpretations.”). 
 130. Katz & Page, supra note 61, at 95–96. Mission creep is also referred to as “legacy 
problems,” “mission drift,” or a lack of a “mission anchor.” It relates to the fact that even if the 
company is able to pursue its social missions while making a profit, the social purpose is at risk 
of changing or even disappearing with the addition of new management. Resor, supra note 46, at 
99. 
 131. See L3C Tally, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, L3C, http://www.intersectorl3c.com/l3c_tally 
.html (last updated Aug. 24, 2014); State by State Legislative Status, B LAB, http://www 
.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Sept. 28, 2014). 
 132. See infra notes 237, 241, and accompanying text. 
 133. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 1. 
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state legislature has proposed a third type of hybrid entity—the Low-
Profit Limited Liability Company (“L3C”).134 The creation of these 
hybrid entities now protects socially responsible California 
corporations, like Patagonia, and provides directors with protection 
to pursue social and environmental causes.135 
The FPC became law in California on January 1, 2012.136 As of 
January 2013, California remains the only state to have passed 
legislation authorizing the FPC.137 Senator Mark DeSaulnier 
introduced the FPC in Senate Bill 201—The Corporate Flexibility 
Act of 2011—on February 8, 2011.138 The FPC was the “brainchild 
of the California Working Group for New Corporate Forms,”139 a 
group of ten California lawyers dedicated to giving greater flexibility 
to socially responsible for-profit businesses.140 It appears that 
California businesses have been a bit cautious in adopting this new 
form, as only thirty-one California companies have registered to 
become FPCs in the first seventeen months since the law’s 
enactment.141 
Sponsored by assembly member Jared Huffman and the 
American Sustainable Business Council,142 California passed the 
Benefit Corporations Code on the same day that the FPC was 
 
 134. S.B. 323, 2011–2012 Leg. § 17701.02 (Cal. 2011). 
 135. See B CORPORATION, 2012 B CORPORATION ANNUAL REPORT 27 (2012), available at 
http://www.bcorporation.net/sites/all/themes/adaptivetheme/bcorp/pdfs/BcorpAP2012_Web-
Version.pdf (“B Corp enshrines Patagonia’s nearly 50 year old model of business into law. And 
that makes it easier for other businesses to adopt this model and use it in their own search for 
stewardship and sustainability.”). 
 136. DEBRA BOWEN, SECRETARY OF STATE, TWO NEW TYPES OF CORPORATIONS EFFECTIVE 
JANUARY 1, 2012 (2011), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/business/be/forms/flexible-purpose-
corp-and-benefit-corp.pdf. 
 137. It is worth noting that the state of Washington has adopted an entity called the “social 
purpose corporation.” Page, Truth About Ben & Jerry’s, supra note 9, at 42. Despite the different 
titles, the language of Washington’s social purpose corporation is very similar to the language of 
California’s FPC. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–3503 (West 2013) (specifying the 
requirements for California’s FPC ), with WASH. REV. CODE §§ 23b.25.005–.25.150 (West 2013) 
(specifying the requirements for Washington’s social purpose corporation). 
 138. Clarke, supra note 52, at 321. 
 139. David Adelman, Just What California Needs: A New Corporate Form, L.A. LAW., Apr. 
2011, at 68, 68. 
 140. Clarke, supra note 52, at 316. 
 141. DEBRA BOWEN, SECRETARY OF STATE, SUPPLEMENTAL LANGUAGE REPORT BUDGET 
LETTER 12-16 (2013), available at www.sos.ca.gov/admin/reports/2013/flexible-purpose 
-corporations-report.pdf. 
 142. State by State Legislative Status, supra note 131. 
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adopted into California law—January 1, 2012.143 On a national and 
state level, B Corp legislation has been more widespread than the 
FPC.144 Maryland became the first state to adopt the B Corp in 
2010.145 There are now twenty-six states that have passed B Corp 
laws146 and twelve more states that have proposed B Corp 
legislation.147 Since enactment, over one hundred companies have 
registered as California B Corps.148 
The L3C was the first profit/nonprofit hybrid entity adopted in 
the United States.149 After Vermont adopted its legislation in 2008, 
eight other states enacted L3C legislation.150 Entrepreneur Robert 
Lang championed the notion of the L3C after he became the CEO of 
his family’s foundation.151 The L3C concept is now being introduced 
and promoted in various state legislatures by the Americans for 
Community Development (a group funded by Lang’s foundation) 
and L3C Advisors.152 
A.  Flexible Purpose Corporation 
Unlike traditional corporate entities, the Flexible Purpose 
Corporation153 form allows California businesses to freely pursue 
social or environmental objectives without exposing directors to 
liability for not maximizing profits.154 Expanding the protection of 
traditional for-profit forms, the FPC protects directors, shareholders, 
and stakeholders of socially conscious businesses in three significant 
ways. 
First, the FPC allows a company to pursue one or more “special 
 
 143. BOWEN, supra note 136; TALLEY, supra note 88, at 4 n.4. 
 144. See TALLEY, supra note 88, at 6. 
 145. See Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 224 n.22. 
 146. State by State Legislative Status, supra note 131. The District of Columbia has also 
passed B Corp legislation. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. BOWEN, supra note 141. Data was measured from January 2012 to June 2013. Id. 
 149. See Clarke, supra note 52, at 312. 
 150. See L3C Tally, supra note 131. 
 151. Malika Zouhali-Worrall, For L3C Companies, Profit Isn’t the Point, CNN MONEY 
(Feb. 9, 2010, 10:49 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/08/smallbusiness/l3c_low_profit 
_companies. Lang felt the need to create the L3C model so that private foundations, like the one 
he ran, could donate “Program-Related Investments” to charitable organizations. Id. 
 152. Witkin, supra note 80. Lang and other early adopters created L3C Advisors to help 
jumpstart and finance other L3Cs. L3C Advisors was the first L3C created. Id. 
 153. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–3503 (West 2013). 
 154. See infra notes 155–58 and accompanying text. 
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purposes”155 in addition to simply maximizing profits.156 The FPC 
code gives great flexibility to what constitutes a special purpose. 
Specifically, this special purpose can be a “charitable or public 
purpose activit[y] that a nonprofit public benefit corporation is 
authorized to carry out,” or a means to improve or advocate for the 
FPC’s employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, community, 
society, or the environment.157 This flexibility shields directors from 
personal liability if they make decisions that favor the company’s 
special purpose over the company’s financial profits.158 
Second, in addition to aiding socially conscious directors, the 
FPC code also ensures full disclosure and adequate transparency to 
socially conscious shareholders. FPCs must send an annual report to 
all shareholders.159 The report must contain a balance sheet, income 
statement, statement of cash flows, and a report from independent 
accountants (if the company used one).160 Moreover, an FPC must 
issue a “[special purpose] management discussion and analysis,” 
which identifies and evaluates how the company is meeting its 
special purpose objectives.161 These extensive and detailed reports 
provide an added measure of transparency and accountability that a 
traditional for-profit corporation is not required to provide.162 
Third, the long-term protection from mission creep163 better 
safeguards stakeholders’ interests.164 In fact, a supermajority vote of 
at least two-thirds is required to eliminate or drastically alter the 
FPC’s special purpose,165 convert the FPC into a solely for-profit 
corporation,166 sell substantially all of the FPC’s assets,167 merge the 
 
 155. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2) (West 2013). “Special purpose” is a term unique to the 
FPC. See id. § 2513; Clarke, supra note 52, at 318–19. 
 156. A special purpose must be specified in the articles of incorporation. Clarke, supra note 
52, at 318 –19. 
 157. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2)(A)–(B) (West 2013). 
 158. Clarke, supra note 52, at 319. 
 159. CAL. CORP. CODE § 3500 (West 2013). 
 160. Id. § 3500(a). 
 161. Id. § 3500(b). If the board withholds expenditures that might relate to the company’s 
special purpose, the company will also have to issue a “special purpose current report.” Id. 
§ 3501. 
 162. See Resor, supra note 46, at 99. 
 163. See supra text accompanying note 130. 
 164. See infra notes 165–69 and accompanying text. 
 165. CAL. CORP. CODE § 3002(c) (West 2013). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. § 3100. 
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FPC into a corporation,168 or reorganize the FPC.169 When businesses 
are organized as FPCs, owners feel secure that their companies’ 
special purpose(s) will survive in the long-term, even in the event of 
a sale, merger, or reorganization.170 
B.  Benefit Corporations 
Similar to an FPC, a Benefit Corporation171 allows its directors 
to pursue a dual purpose without constantly fearing legal 
ramifications for actions that may not maximize shareholder 
wealth.172 However, the B Corp has some distinct differences from 
the FPC that provide even more transparency to a B Corp’s 
shareholders and the general public. While appearing to give similar 
protection to directors as the FPC, the B Corp requires a more 
structured and defined social purpose.173 A B Corp requires that a 
company pursue a “general public benefit,”174 which must have a 
“material positive impact on society and the environment.”175 In 
addition to a general benefit, a B Corp may also identify any 
“specific public benefit” in its articles of incorporation that it wishes 
to pursue.176 
The biggest difference between the FPC and the B Corp is that 
the B Corp provides added transparency and enhanced accountability 
to shareholders.177 Unlike the FPC, which gives nearly unfettered 
 
 168. Id. § 3201. 
 169. Id. § 3401. 
 170. See supra notes 165–69 and accompanying text. See also B Corp, PATAGONIA, 
http://www.patagonia.com/eu/enCZ/patagonia.go?assetid=70725 (last visited Apr. 7, 2013). 
(quoting Chouinard stating that California’s new social enterprise legislation “creates the legal 
framework to enable mission-driven companies . . . to stay mission-driven through succession, 
capital raises, and even changes in ownership, by institutionalizing the values, culture, processes, 
and high standards put in place by founding entrepreneurs”). 
 171. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600–31 (West 2013). 
 172. See infra notes 173–76 and accompanying text. 
 173. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 5. 
 174. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14610(a) (West 2013). 
 175. Id. § 14601(c). While the text of section 14601(c) technically states “society and the 
environment” (emphasis added), it practically refers to a material benefit on the environment, 
shareholders, employees, customers, or the community. See Clarke, supra note 52, at 319. 
 176. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14601(e), 14610(b) (West 2013). 
 177. Compare id. § 3502(b) (mentioning FPCs are given the benefit of a presumption if they 
use “best practices” to measure their special purpose), with id. § 14601(c) (stating that B Corps 
must have a “material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, as 
assessed against a third-party standard”). 
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discretion to its directors to measure its social purpose initiatives, the 
B Corp requires an independent third-party evaluation.178 This 
annual comprehensive assessment179 analyzes whether the B Corp 
benefit corporation dutifully fulfilled its identified public 
benefit(s).180 Accompanying the annual third-party evaluation, a 
California B Corp must also send out a comprehensive annual report 
to all its shareholders.181 Unlike the annual report required for an 
FPC, the B Corp’s “benefit report” must contain the following: a 
“narrative” describing how the B Corp selected its third-party 
standard and how it pursued its general public benefit(s) and specific 
public benefit(s),182 “an assessment of [its] overall social and 
environmental performance,”183 and the “name of each person that 
owns 5 percent or more of [the company’s] outstanding shares.”184 
Lastly, the B Corp creates additional safeguards for socially 
conscious shareholders.185 Specifically, the entity creates a new right 
of action called a “benefit enforcement proceeding.”186 A 
shareholder, director, individual, or an entity explicitly mentioned in 
the bylaws or articles of incorporation, or the B Corp itself may bring 
a benefit enforcement proceeding187 if the B Corp fails to pursue one 
of its listed general or specific public benefits, or fails to deliver its 
annual benefit report to shareholders.188 Additionally, a two-thirds 
supermajority vote is required to eliminate or amend the B Corp’s 
special purpose.189 
C.  Low-Profit Limited Liability Company 
Differing greatly from the organizational structure of the B Corp 
 
 178. Id. § 14601(g) (“‘Third-party standard’ means a standard for defining, reporting, and 
assessing overall corporate social and environmental performance.”). Id. Two companies that are 
commonly used for the “third-party standard” are B Lab and Global Reporting Initiative. Resor, 
supra note 46, at 110. 
 179. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(g)(1) (West 2013). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. § 14630. 
 182. Id. § 14630(a)(1). 
 183. Id. § 14630(a)(2). 
 184. Id. § 14630(a)(3). 
 185. See infra notes 186–89 and accompanying text. 
 186. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623 (West 2013). 
 187. Id. § 14623(b). 
 188. Id. § 14601(b). 
 189. Id. §§ 14601(d)(1)(B); 14610(d). 
HYBRID ENTITIES 9/29/2014 10:51 AM 
2014] HYBRID ENTITIES 641 
 
and the FPC, the last hybrid model, the L3C, offers very distinct 
advantages to social entrepreneurs.190 Although the L3C concept has 
not been enacted in California, it was proposed on February 14, 
2011, in Senate Bill 323.191 
Similar to the other hybrid entities, the L3C allows directors to 
pursue a social purpose, and therefore, directors do not need to be 
solely concerned with maximizing shareholder wealth.192 However, 
unlike the other California hybrid models, profits cannot be a 
significant purpose of the company.193 Instead, the primary purpose 
of the L3C must be to accomplish a charitable or educational 
purpose.194 
Although this restriction on profits may serve to limit capital 
investments from traditional investors, the L3C concept was created 
to increase the total capital available for social entrepreneurs,195 
primarily through IRS-sanctioned Program Related Investments 
(PRIs),196 which are loans or investments from private, charitable 
foundations.197 To qualify as a PRI, “the investment must relate to 
the Foundation’s mission and the risk/reward ratio must exceed that 
of a standard market-driven investment.”198 Because the main goal of 
for-profit companies is to make money—a goal that is incompatible 
with most foundations’ charitable missions—the L3C creates the first 
for-profit entity that is PRI compatible.199 Additionally, the ability of 
the L3C model to make actual returns for investors might attract new 
 
 190. See infra notes 195–99 and accompanying text. 
 191. S.B. 323, 2011–2012 Leg. (Cal. 2011). As of December 2012, the provisions of Senate 
Bill 323 that include the L3C entity have not been enacted into California law. CAL. S. JOURNAL, 
2011–2012 Recess 5137 (2012). 
 192. See S.B. 323 § 17701.02 (j) (Cal. 2011). 
 193. Id. § 17701.02(j)(2). Nor can the appreciation of property be a significant purpose. Id. 
 194. Id. § 17701.02(j)(1)(B). Specifically, the primary purpose must be for “religious, 
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international 
amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.” 26 U.S.C. 
§ 170(c)(2)(B) (2012). 
 195. Neetal Parekh, What is an L3C? (Low-Profit Limited Liability Company), 
INNOV8SOCIAL (Oct. 31, 2011), www.innov8social.com/2011/10/what-is-l3c-low-profit 
-limited.html. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Resor, supra note 46, at 104; Zouhali-Worrall, supra note 151. 
 198. Witkin, supra note 80 (emphasis omitted). 
 199. Clarke, supra note 52, at 309; Zouhali-Worrall, supra note 151. In fact, “[t]he New 
York-based Foundation Center estimates that PRIs made up less than 1% of the charitable 
distributions made by foundations in 2006 and 2007.” Id. 
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socially driven investors who want to be socially responsible, but 
lack the resources to simply donate to traditional nonprofits.200 
IV.  HYBRIDS FIX LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL 
CORPORATE STRUCTURE 
As demonstrated in this section, the FPC, B Corp, and L3C 
forms provide greater (1) protection, (2) transparency, (3) 
accountability, and (4) sustainability than the traditional corporate 
structure. By addressing these four limitations of the traditional 
corporate structure, these new social hybrids not only afford 
directors, founders, and officers increased legal protection but also 
promote confidence to pursue a double bottom line. 
A.  Greater Protection 
Directors and officers of these hybrids can enjoy managerial 
flexibility that was not previously available to companies using the 
traditional corporate structure.201 The restrictive traditional corporate 
structure has made managers of both for-profits and nonprofits leery 
of making decisions that might have maximized their company’s 
social and financial gains.202 Managers of traditional nonprofits were 
forced to restrict their managerial decisions to conform to the strict 
IRS rules governing nonprofits.203 Managers of traditional for-profits 
were forced to second-guess managerial decisions in lieu of the 
strong shareholder wealth maximization norm and the murky 
boundaries of the BJR.204 Formally codifying the language of the 
new structures in the California Corporations Code finally gives  
risk-averse managers and directors of social enterprises the 
confidence to make informed social and financial decisions without 
fearing adverse IRS ramifications or possible litigation from 
shareholders.205 
 
 200. See Murray & Hwang, supra note 44, at 22. 
 201. See Reiser, supra note 2. 
 202. Id. at 609 (“Rather than fearing litigation, the founder of a for-profit social enterprise 
may instead worry about locking in a dual mission legacy, about sufficient access to capital, or 
both.”). Id. at 610. 
 203. Britt et al., supra note 73. 
 204. See supra notes 95–97, 104, and accompanying text. 
 205. Britt et al., supra note 73. 
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B.  Greater Transparency 
The reporting standards required for California’s new social 
enterprises provide more transparency than a traditional corporation 
is required to provide.206 A traditional for-profit could claim it was 
“socially good” or “environmentally green” without really 
quantifying its impact on the society or the environment.207 The 
requirements of the FPC and the B Corp do not permit such 
unsubstantiated claims because both hybrid forms require 
comprehensive annual reports that detail the societal impact of a 
company’s social initiatives to all shareholders.208 In fact, the creator 
of the FPC corporate code “believes strongly these requirements will 
provide a strong incentive for better reporting, greater detail, and 
better explanation of efforts undertaken, permitting far better 
monitoring of greenwashing than is possible today.”209 
In addition to promoting and incentivizing companies to provide 
more detailed reports on social missions, the requirements on social 
impact reporting have also accelerated the area of social impact 
accounting.210 Several prominent organizations, like B Lab or Global 
Reporting Initiative,211 have recently proven that they can effectively 
assess a company’s fulfillment of its social or environmental 
purpose.212 Additionally, the Sustainability Accounting Standards 
Board “is creating standard social accounting tools in the same 
manner that the Financial Accounting Standards Board created 
 
 206. Id. (stating that with the “additional transparency requirements, shareholders will now 
possess important information for determining whether a company is working in a manner and 
with appropriate efficacy to achieve its stated Special Purpose”). 
 207. Id. (“[T]he proposal’s requirements for public transparency and reporting on its efforts 
and success towards achieving its Special Purpose provide the opportunity for more facts than 
previously included in the marketplace for determining the real impact of a company’s claims of 
achieving ‘green’ or ‘good’ results.”). 
 208. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 3500, 14630 (West 2013). 
 209. Britt et al., supra note 73. 
 210. Note that California courts have not developed a set standard for measuring social 
impact accounting. See Britt et al., supra note 73 (stating that there “exist[s] no single accepted, 
well-established standard for measurement of SROI, but rather multiple emerging standards.”); 
Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 256 (“[A]lthough no standard measure for social impact accounting 
yet exists, best practices have emerged.”). 
 211. See Resor, supra note 46, at 110. 
 212. As discussed above, this independent third-party approval is already required for 
California’s Benefit Corporations. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(g) (West 2013). The third party is 
required to assess the B Corp’s impact on its employees, subsidiaries, suppliers, customers, the 
community, and the local and global environment. Id. §§ 14601(g)(1); 14620(b)(2)–(5). 
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standards for financial accounting.”213 
C.  Greater Accountability 
These new transparency requirements also place more 
accountability on the managers and directors of California’s modern 
social enterprises.214 Equipped with a new wealth of information, 
shareholders of these social enterprise forms now possess several 
ways to hold managers accountable for their social and 
environmental actions.215 First, shareholders can vote off board 
members that do not adequately promote the company’s social 
missions.216 Second, shareholders can resort to selling their stock in 
the company, which may ultimately reduce the company’s capital.217 
Third, shareholders can now bring a lawsuit for breach of fiduciary 
duty against directors who fail to follow the social purposes 
articulated in the company’s articles of incorporation.218 Armed with 
these options, shareholders can better serve as “watchdogs” to ensure 
the stated social objectives are carried out. 
D.  Greater Sustainability 
The additional legal protection and accountability standards of 
California’s new hybrid forms also serve to protect the long-term 
sustainability of social enterprises. Mission creep219 is a common 
fear for founders of many social ventures.220 Indeed it was this fear 
that led the Ben & Jerry’s founders, Greenfield and Cohen, to oppose 
Unilever’s takeover.221 The fear of mission creep can prevent owners 
from making beneficial decisions for their social enterprises.222 For 
 
 213. See Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 257. 
 214. Id. at 259. (“This increased transparency is meant to give shareholders the ability to hold 
the flexible purpose corporation's directors and officers accountable for their actions . . . .”). 
 215. Id. (stating that “dissatisfied shareholders can attempt to vote out the board or exit the 
firm themselves by selling their shares.”). 
 216. See id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Britt et al., supra note 73 (stating that “the law always permits shareholders to file suit 
for a director’s breach of fiduciary duties, something that will now include (equally and in the 
same manner) a failure to adhere to the agreed Special Purpose as it currently applies to failures 
to sufficiently emphasize financial returns”). 
 219. See supra text accompanying note 130. 
 220. See Katz & Page, supra note 61, at 95–96. 
 221. See The Scoop on Ben & Jerry’s Sellout, supra note 24. 
 222. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 5. 
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example, fearing the eventual loss of a social purpose, some founders 
may refuse to give up control of their companies and thus decline to 
entertain the issuance of new stock, merger negotiations, 
management changes, or a much overdue retirement—all decisions 
that might better the overall performance of their company.223 The 
requirements of the new California social forms directly recognize 
and alleviate founders’ external and internal fears of mission creep. 
A founder or director under a traditional corporate structure may 
be concerned that a designated social purpose will succumb to an 
external force (i.e., a merger, major reorganization, or a management 
change).224 Founders and directors of FPCs, B Corps, or L3Cs need 
not have this worry, however, as all of California’s new social forms 
require the social purpose to be explicitly listed in the social 
enterprise’s articles of incorporation.225 Furthermore, the B Corp226 
and the FPC227 offer an additional layer of protection to the long-
term sustainability of social missions, as both require a supermajority 
vote of at least two-thirds to change any stated social purpose.228 
Social sustainability is further increased because the new social 
enterprises put shareholders and potential shareholders on notice of 
what they are actually buying in to.229 Whether it is the social and 
environmental purposes directly set out in each company’s publicly 
available articles of incorporation or the distinction of being an FPC, 
B Corp, or L3C, all shareholders should be aware that these 
companies are designed to pursue a double bottom line, which may 
or may not align with shareholder profit maximization.230 As such, 
traditional investors (who focus only on the financial bottom line) 
should temper their expectations for financial returns or, more 
simply, choose not to invest in these dual-purpose entities. In all 
 
 223. See Resor, supra note 46, at 99, 108. 
 224. See Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 235–36 (referencing several examples of socially 
conscious businesses (e.g., Tom's of Maine, Inc., Burt's Bees, Inc., and Ben & Jerry's) that were 
acquired by profit-driven multinational corporations). 
 225. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2602(b)(2), 14610(b) (West 2013). 
 226. Id. § 14610(d). 
 227. Id. § 3002. 
 228. See supra notes 226–27. 
 229. Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 250 (“At the same time, the statement of special purpose in 
the corporate charter puts the world and investors on notice that both financial and non-economic 
values will be pursued.”). 
 230. Id. at 250 n.147. 
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likelihood, most investors of these hybrid corporations will be 
socially conscious investors who measure returns in more than just 
financial terms.231 These investors are less demanding of financial 
returns than traditional investors, and are thus more likely to have 
greater and longer-lasting patience for and understanding of 
directors’ decisions that do not maximize profits.232 
V.  WHY SHOULD CALIFORNIA BECOME THE 
LEADER OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE? 
In addition to the creation of new hybrid forms, social 
entrepreneurship might also benefit from a state assuming a 
leadership position in the development of social enterprise law.233 
California’s unique cultural and social landscape already makes it an 
attractive location for social enterprises.234 California should 
continue to take steps to encourage social ventures to incorporate 
within the state because of the possible financial, environmental, and 
societal impacts these businesses might generate. 
A.  How Social Enterprises Can Benefit from California 
California is a strong, if not the ideal, candidate to become the 
leader of social enterprise law in the United States for three reasons. 
First, California already offers one of the most diverse and 
“tantalizingly unique” selections of social enterprise forms.235 
Second, California’s large economy and physical geography make it 
an appealing location for new and existing businesses.236 Third, 
 
 231. See id. at 227. (“Persons or entities most likely to invest in flexible purpose 
corporations—namely, impact and social investors—do not want shareholder value prioritized 
over social and environmental considerations.”). 
 232. See Jon Carson, Creating an Edge with Mission: Competitive Advantages of For-Profit 
Social Enterprises, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 26, 2012, 1:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/jon-carson/creating-an-edge-with-mis_b_1452162.html (“Social enterprises may receive 
slightly more patience and buy-in from investors, especially if they themselves are mission 
driven.”). 
 233. See Page, Truth About Ben & Jerry’s, supra note 9, at 43. 
 234. See infra notes 235–37 and accompanying text. 
 235. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 4. In addition, the largest business (in terms of revenue 
generated) to have incorporated as a social enterprise company is California’s own Patagonia. 
Felicity Carus, Patagonia: A Values-Led Business from the Start, GUARDIAN (July 17, 2012, 
11:21 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/sustainable-business/patagonia-values-led-business 
-benefit-corp (stating that “Patagonia now has $600m in annual revenues . . . making it the largest 
company so far to sign as a benefit corporation”). 
 236. See infra notes 243–46 and accompanying text. 
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California’s strong long-arm statute provides added protection for 
businesses that incorporate within the state.237 
1.  Diverse Array of Business Entities 
No other state offers the same variety of hybrid enterprises that 
California does.238 In fact, there are only five other states (Illinois, 
Louisiana, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont) that offer more than 
one form of social enterprise.239 All three of these states offer B 
Corps and L3Cs, but none offer the FPC.240 Without the IRS’s 
automatic qualification for L3Cs to qualify as PRIs, the L3C form 
provides very few advantages over the B Corp.241 Thus, at the 
moment, California is the only state that provides two uniquely 
advantageous vehicles for social enterprises.242 
2.  Large Economy 
California’s large size (both in terms of population and 
geography) has prompted many companies to relocate or do business 
within the state’s borders.243 In fact, California is the national leader 
in “registered firms (incorporated or not), employees, and 
payroll.”244 The state is also a leading source of venture capital 
funding and private equity financing.245 Most importantly, California 
currently is home to more companies that seek to pursue a double 
bottom line than any other state.246 Armed with a wealth of resources 
(human capital, financial capital, and natural capital) and a 
trailblazing attitude towards socially conscious businesses,247 
California serves as an ideal location for new social enterprises. 
 
 237. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 4 n.3. 
 238. See infra notes 239–41 and accompanying text. 
 239. See L3C Tally, supra note 131; State by State Legislative Status, supra note 131. 
 240. See supra note 239; see also TALLEY, supra note 88, at 1 (stating that “California’s 
experiment is unique” because it is the first state to offer both the FPC and the B Corp forms). 
 241. The primary purpose for creating the L3C was to “attract program related investments 
(PRIs) from foundations.” Resor, supra note 46, at 104. 
 242. See supra notes 238–41 and accompanying text. 
 243. See TALLEY, supra note 88, at 3. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See Britt et al., supra note 73. 
 246. Id. (stating that California contains “more companies seeking to mix mission and money 
than any other state”). 
 247. See supra notes 243–46 and accompanying text. 
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3.  Protective Long-Arm Statute 
California has one of the most “comprehensive” long-arm 
statutes of any state.248 California grants jurisdiction to its courts “on 
any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the 
United States.”249 The sweeping language of California’s long-arm 
statute imposes no additional limitations on state courts that are not 
already outlined in the constitutions.250 Accordingly, courts have 
held that California’s statute “authorizes the broadest possible 
exercise of judicial jurisdiction.”251 This low jurisdictional threshold 
helps protect California businesses because it makes it easier for 
California businesses to bring lawsuits within the state.252 By doing 
so, California businesses can avoid costly and time-consuming 
litigation in foreign states.253 
B.  How California Can Benefit from Social Enterprises 
California’s emergence as a leader of social enterprise law will 
not only help the development of socially conscious businesses, but 
it could also assist the state financially. In fact, after the enactment of 
the B Corp into law, sponsor Jared Huffman stated, “With this new 
law, we are attracting new socially conscious companies, investors 
and consumers—we’re sending a strong message that California is 
open for this emerging form of business.”254 Huffman hopes that 
California’s strong pro–social enterprise atmosphere will incentivize 
social entrepreneurs to create or move their socially conscious 
businesses within California’s borders.255 This migration of social 
enterprises into the state would infuse more money into the local 
 
 248. John A. Gorfinkel & Richard A. LaVine, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in California Under 
New Section 410.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1163, 1166 (1970). 
 249. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2013). 
 250. Quattrone v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. Rptr. 548, 551 (Ct. App. 1975). 
 251. Id. 
 252. See generally VEDDER, PRICE, KAUFMAN & KAMMHOLZ, P.C., LONG-ARM STATUTES: 
A FIFTY-STATE SURVEY 18, 18–19 (2003) available at http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/law/08 
-732/Jurisdiction/LongArmSurvey.pdf (referencing several cases that illustrate the strength of 
California’s long-arm statute). 
 253. See id. 
 254. Lifsher, Businesses Seek, supra note 15; Patagonia Registers as First California Benefit 
Corporation, B LAB (Jan. 3, 2012, 12:30 PM), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/33565-
Patagonia-Registers-as-First-California-Benefit-Corporation. 
 255. Lifsher, Businesses Seek, supra note 15. 
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economy and ultimately create a larger tax base for the state.256 
Specifically, an influx of new social enterprises into California 
would (1) create more jobs, (2) open up new sources of capital for 
entrepreneurs, (3) generate new taxes, and (4) decrease local and 
state governments’ spending on social and environmental initiatives. 
1.  Create New Jobs 
Social enterprises that relocate into the state to take advantage of 
California’s new hybrid structures would likely need local workers to 
operate.257 Even if companies decide only to incorporate in 
California and not relocate operations, this incorporation activity 
should result in increased work and, correspondingly, more jobs for 
various state departments.258 
2.  Unlock New Sources of Capital 
These new social enterprise forms will also likely open up new 
sources of financing and capital.259 Specifically, these new social 
enterprise forms will be attractive for impact investors,260 social 
investors,261 venture philanthropy firms,262 responsible investing 
funds,263 and private foundations.264 Although these sources of 
impact investing encompass significantly less capital than traditional 
for-profit sources, social investing has been steadily increasing in 
recent years.265 In fact, a report by The Forum for Sustainable and 
 
 256. See infra notes 259, 277–79 and accompanying text. 
 257. See Lifsher, Businesses Seek, supra note 15. 
 258. See MARK DESAULNIER, ANALYSIS OF ORIGINAL BILL – SB 1463 3 (2010), available at 
www.ftb.ca.gov/law/legis/09_10bills/SB1463_021910_040510.pdf (“Staff has determined that 
implementing this bill would have a significant impact to the department because of the new 
workload for collectors to collect tax, process tax clearance letters, retrain staff, and an increased 
number taxpayer calls.”). 
 259. See Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 252–53. 
 260. Impact investors make investments that “create positive impacts and social and 
environmental benefits beyond financial returns.” Id. at 253. 
 261. Social investors seek to make investments that have minimal “negative social and 
environmental impacts.” Id. 
 262. Venture philanthropy firms function like venture capital firms. However, venture 
philanthropy firms only acquire and distribute capital to social enterprises. Id. at 252–53 n.162. 
 263. Responsible (or sustainable) investing funds make investment decisions using 
“environmental, social, and governance (‘ESG’).” Id. at 252. 
 264. Private foundations maintain a set of core social missions and make investments that 
relate and promote their socially geared missions. Id. at 253. 
 265. See id. at 252 n.161. 
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Responsible Investment (“US SIF”) found that sustainable and 
responsible investing increased by nearly 16 percent in 2011 to a 
total of $80.9 billion.266 
Moreover, if the IRS should permit L3Cs to automatically 
qualify as PRIs (which California’s L3C code intentionally mirrors), 
California investors could also tap into previously unavailable capital 
from private foundations.267 Currently, to keep its tax-exempt status, 
a private foundation is required to distribute a certain percentage (at 
least 5 percent268) of its assets each year.269 Foundations can 
distribute their money in only two ways: (1) donate to nonprofit 
entities, where there is no possibility of financial return; or (2) invest 
in for-profit entities through PRIs, which allow financial returns.270 
With the L3C being the only for-profit entity that is meant to qualify 
as a PRI, this emerging hybrid form could attract substantial new 
capital from an otherwise relatively untapped source.271 
3.  Generate New Taxes 
Even if social enterprises do not physically relocate their 
operations or headquarters into the state, California could still profit 
from social companies incorporating in the state. Delaware’s 
expansive case law and pro-business codes have made it the leader in 
corporate business law.272 As a result, corporations commonly 
incorporate in Delaware even if they have little, if any, business 
 
 266. Id. “According to a report by the US SIF Foundation, $80.9 billion was invested by 375 
sustainable and responsible investment funds in the beginning of 2011, representing a 15.9% 
increase from 2010.” Patrick Mitchell, Study: “Alternative Investment” Assets in Sustainable & 
Responsible Investing Jumped 16 Percent in 2010, US SIF (Oct. 26, 2011), 
http://ussif.org/news/releases/pressrelease.cfm?id=181. 
 267. Ron Shoemaker & Bill Brockner, Public Charity Classification and Private Foundation 
Issues: Recent Emerging Significant Developments, in IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATION CPE TEXT 
FOR FY 2000 140, 140 (1999), available at http://www.pgdc.com/pdf/CPE-FY2000.pdf (stating 
that “private foundations have been hard pressed to meet their 5% minimum distribution 
requirement under IRC 4942”). 
 268. I.R.C. § 4942(e) (2012). 
 269. Resor, supra note 46, at 104; Deborah B. Andrews, The ‘L3C’: The New Double-Hybrid 
Entity, PHILANTHROPY J. (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.philanthropyjournal.org/resources 
/managementleadership/%E2%80%98l3c%E2%80%99-new-double-hybrid-entity. 
 270. Witkin, supra note 80. 
 271. See Parekh, supra note 195. 
 272. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., DEL. DEP’T OF STATE, WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 
1–3, 10 (2007). 
HYBRID ENTITIES 9/29/2014 10:51 AM 
2014] HYBRID ENTITIES 651 
 
activities within the state.273 This process has been very financially 
beneficial for the state of Delaware.274 
Like a corporation that is incorporated in Delaware, a social 
enterprise that is incorporated in California can operate or hold its 
headquarters in any state.275 Thus, California can benefit from 
franchise taxes on social enterprises that are incorporated but not 
doing business in California.276 Currently, both B Corps277 and 
FPCs278 are treated as corporations under California’s Corporation 
Tax Law and taxed at a franchise tax rate of 8.84 percent.279 
4.  Decrease the State’s Social and Environmental Burden 
Lastly, an influx of social enterprises into the state would likely 
benefit the environment and local communities in California. These 
societal and environmental gains could reduce the tax burden and 
financial obligations of local and state governments, and ultimately 
allow the government to spend its coveted resources on other 
deserving areas.280 
C.  Steps California Needs to Take 
Recognizing the extensive benefits that the state of California 
 
 273. See id. at 1. 
 274. Id. (“The people of Delaware are aware that the income received from corporation 
franchise taxes is an important part of the state budget and that Delaware law firms that specialize 
in business law matters employ significant numbers of people.”). In fact, Delaware’s franchise 
taxes account for nearly 18 percent of the state’s revenues every year. See STATE OF DELAWARE, 
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, DELAWARE FISCAL NOTEBOOK 29 (2011), available at http://www 
.finance.delaware.gov/publications/fiscal_notebook_11/fiscal_notebook_11.pdf. 
 275. Page, Truth About Ben & Jerry’s, supra note 9, at 43 (“When a form has been enacted in 
one state, it is available to residents of every state.”). 
 276. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23153(b)(1) (West 2012) (stating that “[e]very corporation 
that is incorporated under the laws of this state” has to pay a franchise tax). 
 277. JARED HUFFMAN ET AL., FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, ANALYSIS OF AB 361 (2011), 
www.ftb.ca.gov/law/legis/11_12bills/ab361_Final.pdf. 
 278. DESAULNIER, supra note 35. 
 279. 2014 California Tax Rates and Exemptions, STATE OF CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX 
BOARD, https://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/2014_California_Tax_Rates_and_Exemptions.shtml?WT 
.mc_id=Business_Popular_TaxRates (last visited Sept. 27, 2014). 
 280. For example, a company keeps a manufacturing plant in a city to help bolster its local 
community. Providing steady jobs for an otherwise struggling city could be very advantageous as 
this could reduce government expenditures that commonly result from unemployment. See Marc 
Lifsher, Unemployment Payouts Push California Deeper into Debt, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/06/business/la-fi-jobless-fund-broke-20101107 [hereinafter 
Lifsher, Unemployment Payouts] (stating that the state of California is “borrowing $40 million a 
day from the federal government to provide assistance to jobless workers”). 
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could receive if it does truly become the leader in social enterprise, it 
is important that California continues to take the necessary steps in 
advancing its social enterprise law. To maintain its leadership 
position, California needs to stay educated and informed on new, 
emerging hybrid forms, continue to fortify the protection of social 
enterprises and their directors, and possibly incentivize current  
for-profit entities to convert to social enterprises. At the current 
moment, California should take the following three steps to 
accomplish these goals: (1) pass L3C legislation, (2) develop clear 
case law on the new social enterprise entities, and (3) consider tax 
breaks for social enterprises incorporated in California. 
1.  Pass L3C Legislation 
The first step California should pursue is to repropose and pass 
L3C legislation.281 While the L3C does not offer any distinct 
advantages over California’s FPC or B Corp at the moment, it will be 
a very significant social enterprise model if the IRS decides to grant 
an automatic PRI qualification to this form of business entity.282 
Although this IRS qualification is not certain to be adopted,283 it 
would still benefit California to become familiar with the entity (as 
California should be prepared to have first-mover advantage should 
the IRS adopt the PRI qualification). 
2.  Develop Social Enterprise Case Law 
The more difficult step for California is to develop clear case 
law surrounding its new social enterprise entities. To date, no state or 
federal court has taken on the validity of these new hybrid entities.284 
If the California state courts could tackle the validity of these hybrid 
 
 281. The L3C legislation could mirror the L3C language from S.B. 323, a bill that proposed 
the L3C form in California in 2011 but ultimately was never passed. See supra note 191. 
 282. Parekh, supra note 195; Zouhali-Worrall, supra note 151. Although California’s 
requirements for L3Cs mimic the exact language as the IRS requirements for a PRI, the IRS has 
not yet recognized L3Cs as automatically qualifying PRIs. Anne Field, IRS Rule Could Help the 
Fledgling L3C Corporate Form, FORBES (May 4, 2012, 11:32 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites 
/annefield/2012/05/04/irs-rules-could-help-the-fledgling-l3c. 
 283. L3C’s, B Corps and Social Enterprises, GILLESPIE L. GROUP BLOG (Apr. 12, 2011), 
http://gillespielawgroup.com/our_blog/2011/l3cs-b-corps-and-social-enterprises (noting that the 
IRS has given “no indication that they will do so in the near future”). 
 284. See Resor, supra note 46, at 113 (stating that no court has taken on the validity of B 
Corps yet). 
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models in court, social enterprises would know what to expect during 
litigation and have clear standards on how to conduct their affairs.285 
Setting this legal precedent would instill confidence and trust in risk-
averse entrepreneurs, directors,286 and socially conscious 
investors,287 encouraging them to use California’s new hybrid 
entities. 
3.  Consider Tax Breaks 
To encourage more companies to incorporate in California, the 
California state legislature should also consider tax breaks for these 
new social enterprise forms.288 Specifically, the state could lower its 
franchise tax on these new hybrid forms. Currently, California taxes 
FPCs and B Corps under the same franchise tax rate as general 
corporations and Limited Liability Companies,289 despite the societal 
and environmental benefits that the social enterprises will 
undoubtedly provide for the state. Tax incentives for creating jobs in 
California or relocating headquarters to California should also be 
considered.290 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
For years, the story of the takeover of Ben & Jerry’s has served 
as a cautionary tale for socially conscious businesses across the 
nation.291 The plight of Cohen and Greenfield illustrates the limited 
protections that the traditional corporate structure provides to social 
entrepreneurs. Yet, in the wake of an emerging body of social 
 
 285. See TALLEY, supra note 88, at 10 (suggesting that an “absence of developed case law” 
might be a reason why the uptake rates of California’s new hybrid entities have been relatively 
modest). 
 286. See Plerhoples, supra note 12, at 264 (“To the extent that directors are risk-averse, the 
lack of corporate law precedent is a true barrier to the proliferation of these new corporate 
forms.”). 
 287. See id. at 226 (“[C]ourts adjudicate issues facing these new corporate forms to create a 
body of case law, this author predicts that social entrepreneurs and social investors will remain 
wary of using the new corporate forms for their businesses.”). 
 288. See, e.g., Gomez, supra note 84 (“While benefit corporations do not enjoy any federal or 
state tax benefits that are equivalent to charities, B-Corps were granted tax breaks by the City of 
Philadelphia.”). 
 289. 2011 California Tax Rates and Exemptions, supra note 279. 
 290. Maureen Gorsen, California Proposes to Create New Corporate Entity for 
Environmentally/Socially Conscious Companies, ALSTON & BIRD, LLP TAX BLOG 
(Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.alston.com/taxblog/blog.aspx?entry=4399. 
 291. Jenna Lawrence, Making the B List, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2009 at 66.  
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enterprise statutes, the story of Ben & Jerry’s may now serve to 
demonstrate how far social enterprise law has advanced. Indeed, Jeff 
Furman, the current chairman of Ben & Jerry’s,292 recently illustrated 
how the creation of social enterprises has altered the corporate 
governance landscape: “If benefit corporations had existed back in 
2000, the [Ben & Jerry’s] board probably wouldn’t have agreed to 
the Unilever deal.”293 Confirming his confidence in the new 
protections afforded to social enterprises under the evolving 
California laws, Ben & Jerry’s recently followed Patagonia’s lead 
and incorporated as a B Corp.294 
With several states adopting their own hybrid structures, it is 
now up to socially conscious businesses to take advantage of the 
distinct benefits offered by each of these new social enterprise forms. 
If flexibility is important to a social enterprise, convert to an FPC.295 
If social image is critical, convert to a B Corp.296 If access to capital 
from foundations297 is vital, convert to an L3C.298 No matter which 
of these new hybrid forms is selected, directors and officers will have 
the freedom to pursue a double bottom line without the burden of 
strict IRS compliance or the fear of shareholder litigation for not 
maximizing profits. 
Already equipped with the most diverse menu of social 
enterprise forms—the FPC, the B Corp, and legislation for the 
 
 292. Furman was also a director of Ben & Jerry’s during the buyout by Unilever. Angus 
Loten, With New Law, Profits Take a Back Seat, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2012, at B1. 
 293. Id. (quoting Loten who is paraphrasing a statement made by Jeff Furman). 
 294. Ben & Jerry’s Joins the B Corp Movement!, BEN & JERRY’S, http://www.benjerry.com 
/company/b-corp (last visited Apr. 7, 2013); Joe Van Brussel, Ben & Jerry's Becomes B-Corp 
Certified, Adds Credibility to Impact Investing Movement, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 25, 2012, 
10:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/23/ben-and-jerrys-b-corp-impact-investing 
_n_2005315.html (stating that Ben & Jerry’s is “the first and only wholly-owned subsidiary of a 
public company to become a B-Corporation”). 
 295. See Kyle Westaway, New Legal Structures for 'Social Entrepreneurs', WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 12, 2011, 12:42 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702034133045770 
88604063391944.html (stating that the FPC is an ideal form for companies that want “to do good 
on their own terms"). 
 296. See id. (stating that the B Corp form is ideal for companies that “want to create a 
measurable positive impact”). 
 297. Foundational investors are nonprofit entities that donate capital to support various 
charitable or mission driven organizations. See, e.g., Foundation Fact Sheet, BILL & MELINDA 
GATES FOUNDATION, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/General-Information 
/Foundation-Factsheet (last visited Apr. 11, 2013) (listing mission driven organizations that the 
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has donated to in recent years). 
 298. See Britt et al., supra note 73. This is assuming California passes the L3C legislation. 
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L3C—California has emerged as an early trailblazer of social 
enterprise law. In addition to accommodating social entrepreneurs, 
California’s focus on promoting social enterprises might also benefit 
the average Californian citizen. 
However, even if these new social enterprise forms fail to 
ultimately create a substantial amount of new jobs or tax revenues 
for the state of California, these entities provide a critical message 
for socially conscious individuals: California is open for social 
enterprise. Directors: Your social and environmental actions can now 
be protected. Entrepreneurs: You can now sell, reorganize, or merge 
your company without the fear of mission creep. Investors: You can 
now finance businesses that connect the moral causes you support 
with a more desirable financial return. Socially conscious 
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